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CASE NOTES
shall, like Erie, will have these same desirable effects. Finally, even
though Marshall appears to be inconsistent with some of the lan-
guage in Hanna, it would seem to be the proper interpretation in
light of Hanna's reaffirmation of the holding in Erie, that federal
courts must apply state substantive law.' 25
 Thus, since application
of the Marshall rule is consistent with Erie and promotes
federalism, it is submitted that the Supreme Court should adopt the
Marshall rule for the resolution of Federal Rule-state law conflicts.
LUCY WEST BEHYMER
Constitutional Law—Public Utilities—State Action—Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co.' —Petitioner Catherine Jackson was a resi-
dential customer of respondent Metropolitan Edison Company
(Metropolitan), 2 receiving electric service at her home in York,
Pennsylvania under an account in her name. Metropolitan term-
inated Jackson's account in September 1970 because of an asserted
delinquency in payments; 3 however, service to the residence was
restored under a new account in the name of a cooccupant, James
Dodson. Dodson left the residence in August 1971, and while
electrical power continued to be provided after his departure, no
subsequent payments were made for this service. 4 On October 6,
1971, two employees of Metropolitan visited the Jackson home in an
unsuccessful attempt to locate Dodson and collect the arrearages.
Another employee arrived on the following day, and upon investiga-
tion, informed Jackson that the meter had been tampered with so as
to prevent registration of the electricity consumed. 5 Disclaiming any
knowledge of this situation, Jackson attempted to have electrical
125 380 U.S. at 465, 471.
— U.S. —, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
2 Metropolitan Edison is a "privately owned and operated" utility holding a certificate of
public convenience issued by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (Pa. Pub, Util.
Carnal)). Metropolitan is the sole distributor of electric power to a service area that includes
York, Pa. 95 S. Ct. at 451, 459.
3
 The termination of service in September 1970 was not directly in issue in Jackson,
however, a reading of the lower court opinions in this case suggests that Metropolitan's record
of the outstanding balance was a factor in the subsequent termination of service in October
1971. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 483 F.2d 754, 755-56 (3d Cir. 1973); Jackson
v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F. Supp, 954, 955-56 (M.D. Pa, 1972).
95 S. Ct. at 451.
3
 Id. at 452. Although Metropolitan's tariff provided the right to discontinue service for
"fraud or tampering" with the meter, the company did not choose to assert this ground as a
basis for the termination. Id. at 451 n.1. See note 7 infra. Furthermore, the certificate of
public convenience conferred upon Metropolitan certain rights of eminent domain, Pa, Stat.
Ann. tit., 66, § 1124 (Supp. 1974), as well as the right of entry to a customer's property for
maintenance and inspection of equipment. Pa, Pub. Util. Comm'n Elec. Reg., Rule 14D
[hereinafter cited as Rule 14D], cited in Jackson, 95 S. Ct. at 462 n. I . See notes 32, 33, 47
infra.
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service reinstated, this time under the name of Robert Jackson, later
identified as her twelve-year-old son. 6
Without further notice Metropolitan discontinued electrical
service to the Jackson residence four days later.' In response,
Jackson instituted suit against Metropolitan in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, 8 seeking
compensation • for damages, and an injunction to restrain the termi-
nation of service until she had been afforded notice, a hearing, and
the opportunity to pay any outstanding balance found due. 9 Basing
her suit upon the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (hereinafter section
1983), 10 Jackson claimed that a state-regulated public utility, acting
under color of state law, had deprived her of a protected property
interest" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." The district court granted Metropolitan's motion to
dismiss, holding that the termination of service by Metropolitan was
not reviewable under the Fourteenth Amendment, because the state
6 95 S. Ct. at 452.
Metropolitan discontinued electric power "by disconnecting the line on the company's
utility pole on the street near the plaintiff's house." 483 F.2d at 755. Presumably, Metropoli-
tan contended that its right to discontinue Jackson's service was derived from Rule 15 of
Tariff No. 41, which reads in part:
Company reserves the right to discontinue its service on reasonable notice and
to remove its equipment in case of nonpayment of bill or violation of the Pennsyl-
vania Public Utility Commission's or Company's Rules and Regulations; or, without
notice, for abuse, fraud, or tampering with the connections, meters or other equip-
ment of Company. Failure by Company to exercise this right shall not be deemed a
waiver thereof.
Met. Edison Co. Elec. Tariff, Elec. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 41, Rule 15 [hereinafter cited
at Rule 151, quoted in Jackson, 95 S. Ct. at 451.
3 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 348 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
9 95 S. Ct. at 452. It appears that Jackson made tenders of partial payment of arrearages
to Metropolitan, but that the company did not accept her compromise. 348 F. Supp. at 956.
10 Act of April 20, 1871, Ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13, now codified in 42 U.S.C. I 1983
(1970). To prosecute a claim successfully under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (I) that the
defendant has deprived him of a federally protected right (an "entitlement"); and (2) that the
action was under color of law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). The
requirement that the defendant must have acted under color of law is treated by the courts as
the functional equivalent of the state action test under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). But cf. Adickes, supra at 211 (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
11 In her brief, petitioner apparently relied upon such cases as Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1971), Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), in an effort to establish that her right to receive utility service was tantamount to a
constitutional right or 'entitlement" from the state. 483 F.2d at 761. The Supreme Court
never reached this issue because of its conclusion on the threshold question of state action. 95
S. Ct. at 452 n.2, 457. HOwever the Third Circuit briefly addressed Jackson's claim of
entitlement. Distinguishing the above cited cases, the court concluded that "Mlle 'entitlement'
cases generally deal with a privilege or right conferred by the state of something which it
alone can grant . . . We do not believe that there is a property right to be furnished utility
services without payment." 483 F.2d at 761 n.14. But see 95 S. Ct. at 460 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
12 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: "[Nlor shall any state deprive




was not sufficiently involved in the challenged activity to warrant a
finding of state action." The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the ground
that the state's involvement was de minimus under the applicable
state action test."
On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, i 5 in an
opinion by Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court HELD: a state is
not sufficiently connected with the termination of electrical service
to attribute that conduct to the state under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, where it is shown only that the public utility is heavily
regulated, enjoys a partial monopoly within its service area, and
elects to terminate service in a manner that the state public utilities
commission found permissible under state law.' 6
The Supreme Court's conclusion that state involvement in Met-
ropolitan's termination of service to Jackson was insufficient to
warrant a finding of state action is noteworthy for a number of
reasons. In a practical sense, the effect of the Jackson decision is to
preclude the federal judiciary from entertaining due process claims
of customers of public utilities unless the plaintiff can show a greater
degree of state involvement in the challenged activity than was
demonstrated in the instant case. Moreover, from an analytic
standpoint, the Jackson opinion has broader implications; it portends
new developments in the Fourteenth Amendment state action
analysis. The importance of the decision should be assessed in light
of the type of inquiry conducted, as well as the Court's markedly
different approach to the sufficiency test by which state action will
be determined in a given situation. The emerging attitude of a
present majority of the Court appears to be a more restrictive
approach to the question of the nature and sufficiency of state
involvement necessary to constitute state action. It would seem that
the effect of the majority view is to prescribe that the nexus between
the state and the challenged activity must be closer than has been
necessary in the past. Although the broadest effects of this adjust-
ment will not become fully apparent until the Jackson approach is
applied by the Court in future cases," it is not unreasonable to
conclude that the Jackson opinion limits the reach of the state action
doctrine and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Beginning with the Court's opinion in Jackson, the indices of
state involvement identified by the petitioner, in support of her
348 F. Supp. at 955, 958.
14 483 F.2d at 762. Although the court of appeals noted that "plaintiff's position has
strong appeal," it agreed with the district court's application of a narrow view of the color of
state law test. The Third Circuit found "no overriding justification for utilization of the Civil
Rights Act to intrude the federal courts into what is and should remain a state regulatory
process." Id. at 762.
35 415 U.S. 912 (1974).
' 6 95 S. Ct. at 457. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall filed separate dissenting
opinions.
17 See note 113 infra.
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contention that there was sufficient state action to invoke the juris-
diction of the federal courts will be considered briefly. Next, the
emerging state action analysis contained in the six-Justice majority
opinion in Jackson will be discussed in terms of the type of inquiry
which is now required to be conducted and the amount of state
involvement necessary to support a finding of state action. It will be
submitted that by adhering to a narrow view of the state action test in
Jackson, the Court reached an incorrect result on the facts of this case.
It will be further suggested that the application of this strict test is
directly attributable to the desires of the present majority of the Court
to afford the conduct of "private" individuals a greater degree of
immunity from the review of the federal courts under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I. THE STATE AND THE UTILITY: ASPECTS OF STATE
INVOLVEMENT IN Jackson
Whether public utilities are required by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to afford their customers notice and a
hearing prior to a termination of service is an issue that has been the
source of much recent litigation" and commentary." Utility cus-
tomers, such as Jackson, have challenged summary termination
procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment by instituting suit in
federal court under section 1983, 20 for violation of their civil rights.
The threshold issue in this litigation is whether state involvement in
18 Prior to Jackson, courts were split on the state action-due process issue regarding the
conduct of public utilities. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas, Inc., 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir.
1973), modified, Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 607 (1974) (state action present, but
analysis limited to public utility area); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973) (no state action); Ihrke v. Northern States
Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972) (state action
present); Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890 (1972) (no state action); Martin v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 441
F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1971) (no state action); Kaldec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969) (no state action). See also Bronson v. Consolidated
Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (state action present); Hattel v. Public Serv.
Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972) (state action present); Stanford v. Gas Serv. Co., 346
F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972) (state action present); Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58 (D.
Minn. 1972) (state action present); Morgan v. Kennedy, 331 F. Supp. 861, (D. Neb. 1971)
(state action present); Davis v. Weir, 328 F. Supp: 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (state action present);
Sokol v. Public Util. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 418 P.2d 265, 53 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1966) (state
action present); Taglianetti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 R.I. 351, 103 A.2d 67 (1954)
(no state action).
19 See, e.g., Haydock, Public Utilities and State Action: The Beginning of Constitutional
Restraints, 49 Denver L.J. 413 (1973); Note, 14 B.C. Ind. & COMM. L. Rev. 317 (1972);
Note, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 1057 (1973); Comment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 656 (1974); Comment, 62
Colum. L. Rev. 312 (1962); Note, 6 Creighton L. Rev. 417 (1973); Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1477 (1973); Note, 58 Iowa L. Rev. 1161 (1973); Comment, 39 Mo. L. Rev. 205 (1974); Note,
48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493 (1973); Comment, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 222 (1973); Comment, 24 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 744 (1972); Note, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 529 (1973); Comment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 840
(1974); Note, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 745 (1971); Note, 76 West Va. L. Rev. 492 (1974).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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the challenged action has been sufficient to support a finding of state
action; this issue arises from the Fourteenth Amendment require-
ment that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. The Supreme Court first took
cognizance of the limited scope of this Amendment when, in its
seminal decision in The Civil Rights Cases, 2 ' the Fourteenth
Amendment proscriptions were held to be applicable only to state
action, and not to the action of private individuals. 22 In recent
years, however, litigants in the federal courts have argued for an
expansion of the scope of the state action doctrine in their efforts to
bring certain activities, previously assumed to be purely private in
nature, within the purview of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 23 Similarly, the petitioner in Jackson sought to
obtain from the Court a broader and more-inclusive definition of
state action.
The appellant in Jackson apparently based her claim of state
action upon an identification of six aspects of state involvement in
Metropolitan's termination procedures. 24 The Court addressed each
of these issues in sequence, and concluded it was unpersuaded by
Jackson's argument. 25 Jackson attempted to persuade the Court that
extensive state regulation of the utility was evidence of state ac-
tion. 26 Relying upon Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 27 and Public
21 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22 In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court sustained a broad constitutional challenge to the
authority of Congress to enact §§ I & 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which attempted to
regulate private conduct. 109 U.S. at 13. The Court reasoned:
And so in the present case, until some State law has been passed, or some State
action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United
States under said amendment, nor any proceedings under said legislation, can be
called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and
acts done under State authority.
109 U.S. at 13. It is important to note that in drawing the distinction between the proscrib-
able acts of the state and those individual activities immune from the limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment in The Civil Rights Cases, the Court intimated a willingness to
dissolve this wall of immunity if the acts of the private individual were "sanctioned in some
way by the State, or . . . done under State authority ...." Id. at 17. See notes 88-98 infra and
accompanying text.
The case most often cited as supporting the continued viability of this public-private •
distinction is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), cited by the Court in Jackson, 95 S. Ct.
at 453, Shelley is discussed at note 99 and text at notes 105-09 infra.
23 See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal, First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, — U.S. —, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974) (self-help repossession under Uniform Commer-
cial Code § 9-503); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (freedom of speech challenge
against shopping center); Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir, 1968) (due process challenge to
private school receiving aid).
24 ,For extensive consideration of the aspects of state inolvement in public utilities on a
national scale, see Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477 (1973). See also Note 14 B.C. Ind. & Com. L.
Rev. 317 (1972); Comment, 74 Colum, L. Rev. 656 (1974); Comment, 60 Va. L. Rev, 840
(1974); authorities cited at note 19 supra.
25 95 S. Ct. at 454.
26
 Id. at 453.
27 407 U.S. 163 (1972). Moose Lodge involved a suit by a Negro who, while a guest of
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Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 28 a majority of the Court in Jackson
concluded that state regulation of a privately owned and operated
public utility would not, by itself, warrant bringing the actions of
the utility within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 The
Court reached this decision even though the state regulation was
detailed and resulted in a type of state-protected monopoly." Mind-
ful of its conclusion that there must be more involvement of the
state than mere regulation of the utility, the Court framed the
ensuing state action test as "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
the State itself. " 31 In terms of its over-all analysis, it is significant
that the Court apparently treated the aspect of state regulation as an
underlying condition, albeit insignificant in and of itself, upon
which other aspects of state involvement could be superimposed to
justify a finding of state action. 32 In the context of this analysis,
however, the fact that the relationship between the state and the
one of its members, had been denied service in the private club solely because of his race. The
basis for complainant's Equal Protection claim was that the state's issuance of a private club
liquor license had amounted to an involvement in the club's discriminatory practice sufficient
to constitute state action. The Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court stressed the
fact that the state in no way fostered or encouraged the racial discrimination and furthermore,
that the discrimination originated solely in private individuals. Id. at 171-77.
25
 343 U.S. 451 (1952). A regulated street railway company in the District of Columbia
had established a policy of receiving and amplifying radio programs in its streetcars and
buses. Responding to passengers' complaints, the public utilities commission conducted an
investigation and held a hearing, after which it concluded that the radio service enhanced the
public service. The commission thus permitted the practice to continue. A number of passen-
gers then instituted suit against the commission, claiming a violation of First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Id. at 453-60. While reasoning that the action of the commission
amounted to an "authorization and approval" of the challenged practice sufficient to consti-
tute "federal action" under the Fifth Amendment, the Court concluded on the merits of the
case that there was no First or Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id. at 463-66. The court in
Pollak did not rely upon the aspect of monopoly status. Id. at 462. Compare the discussion of
Pollak in the Jackson opinion, 95 S. Ct. at 456-57 with Justice Marshall's , dissent, id. at 463
n3. See also notes 37, 40.41 & accompanying text infra.
29
 95 S. Ct. at 453-54. From a practical view, a regulatory scheme is the converse of a
supportive involvement of the state, insofar as it restricts the otherwise free exercise of private
enterprise. Without the addition of a more positive form of state encouragement favoring the
performance of a particular activity, it would be unfair, in due process terms, to treat the acts
of a regulated entity to be those of the state for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Note, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 656, 685-90 (1974). But cf. Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493,
497-506 (1973).
3° 95 S. Ct. at 453.
31 Id.
3z As a part of its regUlatory scheme, the State of Pennsylvania granted Metropolitan
specific powers: limited rights of eminent domain and rights of entry upon customers' property
for purposes of inspection and maintenance of equipment. See note 5 supra. Arguably, this
grant of power could constitute a sufficient state involvement in Metropolitan's procedures to
warrant a finding of state action if Metropolitan had actually exercised one of these powers in
terminating Jackson's service. See 95 S. Ct. at 454; note 47 infra. But see 95 S. Ct. at 457
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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entity must reach to the specific activity being challenged, will likely
preclude a finding of state action on the basis of regulation. 33
Jackson next proposed that the state's conferral of monopoly
status upon Metropolitan indicated the presence of state action. 34
Although questioning whether the state had, in fact, granted or
guaranteed Metropolitan a monopoly, the majority assumed that the
state had granted the utility that priviledged status. 35 However, the
Court concluded that conferral of this status would not, in and of itself,
be determinative of the state action question. 36 The fundamental and
dispositive issue was deemed to be the existence of a sufficiently close
relationship between the monopoly status and the specific action chal-
lenged. The Court again relied upon Pollak to reaffirm its "expressly
disclaimed reliance" on the factor of monopoly status," and upon
Moose Lodge, to exemplify a situation where certain monopoly aspects
were present, but the state's involvement was nevertheless deemed
insufficient. 38 The majority concluded that, "[i]n each of those cases,
there was insufficient relationship between the challenged actions of
the entities involved and their monopoly status. There is no indication
of any greater connection here."39 Both Justices Douglas" and Mar-
3 ' Judge Friendly, in the case of Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), stated:
"[Tjhe state must be involved not simply with some activity of the institution alleged to have
inflicted injury upon a plaintiff, but with the activity that caused the injury. Putting the point
another way, the state action, not the private action, must be the subject of the complaint."
Id. at 81. On the facts presented in Jackson, it would seem clear that this grant of eminent
domain and/or right of entry would be of no relevance in this test if the specific right had not
been exercised in the termination of service by Metropolitan. Under this type of analysis,
then, electric utilities would be well advised to refrain from using any such extraordinary
powers, and restrict themselves to the simple and apparently quite effective technique of
cutting off the service at the utility pole, as was done in Jackson. 483 F.2d at 755.
34 95 S. Ct. at 454.
35 Id. at 454 n.8. The Court was apparently impressed by the absence of specific
language, in either the certificate of public convenience or the Pennsylvania statutes, indicat-
ing that Metropolitan was the receipient of a grant or guarantee of monopoly. It noted that
Metropolitan faces competition "within portions of its service area," and it emphasized further
that a public utility is a "natural monopoly" created by market forces. Id.
" Id. at 454.
37 Id. This "disclaimer" would appear to have been read far too literally since the context
of the quotation intimates quite clearly that monopoly status was not deemed irrelevant in
Pollak, but merely that the commission's approval of the challenged conduct was a far more
significant involvement. See Pollak, 343 U.S. at 462. See also note 28 supra & notes 40-41
infra,
33 95 S. Ct. at 454. The monopoly factor was considered in Moose Lodge, but the Court
found that the grant of a liquor license "fell short" of conferring monopoly status upon the
private club. 407 U.S. at 177.
39 95 S. Ct. at 454.
49 Id. at 457-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Particularly noteworthy is Justice Douglas's
comment upon the Court's interpretation of Pollak: "Our disclaimer of reliance upon this
factor in [Pollak] should not be read as holding that monopoly status is wholly irrelevant; the
'disclaimer' on its face simply states that monopoly status was not used as an ingredient of the
finding of federal governmental involvement in that case." Id. at 458 n.4. Justice Douglas
would treat monopoly status as "highly relevant" in assessing the "aggregate weight" of state
involvement. Id. at 458.
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shall41
 disagreed with the majority's position on the ground that the
Court not only disregarded prior cases, but misconstrued Pollak so as
practically to eliminate monopoly status as a factor to be considered in
weighing state contacts with the challenged activity.
It was further contended by Jackson that by providing an
essential public service in the distribution of electrical power, Met-
ropolitan performed a "public function," and thus should be subject
to the constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment. 42 Recognizing that
it had "of course found state action present in the exercise by private
entity (sic) of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the
State,"43 the Court nonetheless concluded that Metropolitan's ter-
mination of service did not fall within this category." "While the
Pennsylvania statute imposes an obligation to furnish service on
regulated utilities, it imposes no such obligation on the State." 45 As
Id. at 461-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also disagreed with the
Court's treatment of this issue of monopoly status. He complained that the Court's approach
failed to recognize "the State's policy of utilizing private monopolies to provide electric
service," and ensuring, through regulation and cooperation, that "the company's service will
be the functional equivalent of service provided by the State." Id. at 461-62. See generally
Comment, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 656 (1974); Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477 (1973).
"2 95 S. Ct. at 454.
13 Id .
44 Id. In the Jackson opinion, the term "public function" would seem to have been
equated—or at least used interchangeably—with "municipal duty," "state obligation," "power
traditionally associated with sovereignty," and a service that is "traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the State." Id. The Court concluded nonetheless, that Metropolitan's act of
termination did not fit under any of these terms. Somewhat revealing, in this regard, is the
analysis set forth in the majority opinion in Moose Lodge, which also was written by Justice
Rehnquist:
The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by an otherwise
private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection Clause if the private entity
receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state
regulation in any degree whatsoever. Since state-furnished services include such
necessities of life as electricty, water, and police and fire protection, such a holding
would utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state
conduct set forth in the Civil Rights Cases . . .
407 U.S. at 173. It would appear, then, that the Court in Jackson was more interested in
whether the state could be compelled to provide the service, rather than whether the function
is characteristically performed, directly or indirectly, by the state.
If, as Justice Marshall suggests in Jackson, the state has an identifiable policy of utilizing
private monopolies to provide utility service, 95 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting), this
arrangement could be treated as an implied agency for the purposes of the state action
doctrine. Under such an approach, the statutory obligation imposed upon the utility to
provide service would be imputed to the state, and the acts of the utility would be deemed
ratified by the state because of: (1) its acceptance of the benefits therefrom; and (2) its approval
of the practice through the state.public utilities commission's procedures. See Comment, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 656, 680-85 (1974). Cf. Bowman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531
(5th Cir. 1960), discussed'at note 69 infra.
45 95 S. Ct. at 454. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, § 1171 (1937), provides: "Every public utility
shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe and reasonable services and facilities
Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without unreasonable interruptions or
delay." Justice Brennan would read this provision as limited by § 25 of the General Rules and
Regulations, Electrical Service Tariff, to "customers," 95 S. Ct. at 460 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). As it was his view that Jackson ceased to be a customer in September 1970, Justice
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supplying utility services was not found to be "traditionally the
prerogative of the State" under Pennsylvania law," the majority
decided that Metropolitan did not perform a public function. 47
The Court also rejected Jackson's contention that Metropolitan
was "affected with the public interest," and that its act of terminat-
ing service should consequently be considered state action." The
majority declined to expand this doctrine, which had been confined
to a "limited line of cases," for reasons that were stated in its prior
decision in Nebbia v. New York." The Court in Jackson reasoned
Brennan would have ordered the complaint dismissed since there was no basis for finding an
entitlement and a deprivation thereof. Id.
46 95 S. Ct. at 454. In support of this conclusion, the Court cited two Pennsylvania
cases, and stated that "[t]he Pennsylvania courts have rejected the contention that the
furnishing of utility services are either state functions or municipal duties." Id., citing Baily v.
Philadelphia, 184 Pa. 594, 602, 39 A. 494, 495 (1898); Girard Life Ins. Co. v, Philadelphia, 88
Pa. 393 (1879). However, these cases support the Court's assertion that Pennsylvania did not
view the furnishing of utility service as a "state function", only to the extent that the term Is
defined as an enforceable obligation. See note 44 supra. It is submitted that a better reading of
these cases is that utility service was considered a characteristic activity of the state, whereby
it could furnish the service itself, while operating in the form of a municipal corporation, or it
could choose to delegate the authority to a private corporation, while asserting regulatory
authority to insure fair and adequate public service. See Bailey, 184 Pa. at 602-04, 39 A. at
495; Girard, 88 Pa. at 394 (by implication).
47
 95 S. Ct. at 454-55. The Court noted that "riff we were dealing with the exercise by
Metropolitan of some power delegated to it by the State which is traditionally associated with
sovereignty, such as eminent domain, our case would be quite a different one." Id. Metropoli-
tan is granted such a right by statute. Id. at 462 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, this
power was not exercised by Metropolitan in this particular termination. See notes 5, 32, 33
supra. This aspect of the Court's opinion indicates a concern less with the result achieved,
i.e., discontinuance of electric service, than with the means employed by the company to
achieve the termination. This analysis deemphasizes the importance of the fact of termination
itself, focusing instead upon the potential for other violations incurred during the attempt to
effect the termination, such as trespass. Query whether the Court would similarly characterize
the right of entry granted Metropolitan as a power traditionally associated with sovereignty,
thus presenting a "different case".
41
 95 S. Ct. at 455.
44
 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Appearing in the Jackson opinion is a passage from Nebbia to the
effect that "[e]xpressions 'affected with a public interest' and 'clothed with a public use' .. .
are not susceptible to definition and form an unsatifactory test." 95 S. Ct. at 455, quoting
from Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 536. Although this quotation supports the Court's proposition that
the status, "affected with the public interest," provides an insufficient single factor test, it is
submitted that in the context of Jackson, Nebbia is actually inapposite to the relevant question
of whether this status is a factor of state involvement that can properly be considered under a
state action analysis,
Presented in Nebbia was a substantive due process attack upon the constitutionality of a
New York statute that sought to prevent price-cutting in the milk industry by regulating the
price at which storekeepers could purchase from milk dealers. One of petitioner's arguments
in Nebbia was that the category of businesses affected with the public interest referred to a
closed class of enterprises that could be regulated by the state, a class that did not include the
milk industry. 291 U.S. at 532. Had the Court in Nebbia defined "public interest" narrowly,
and thus excluded the milk industry from the scope of proper state regulation under its police
powers, the Court would have effectively delimited the powers of the state to regulate matters
of local concern. The Court chose to view the expression "affected with a public interest" as
an inartful phrase, "not susceptible of definition . . . [forming] an unsatisfactory test of the
constitutionality of legislation directed at business practices or prices." Id. at 536. It stated
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that regulated businesses, which characteristically provide essential
public services and are thus affected with a public interest, should
not by that status alone have their every action attributed to the
state for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 °
Two additional factors were presented by the petitioner to
indicate the 'nature and extent of the state's involvement in Met-
ropolitan's termination procedures; each was rejected by the Court.
It was contended that the state's authorization and approval of
Metropolitan's practice of summary discontinuance of electric ser-
vice constituted state action. 5 ' The Court concluded, however, that
there was no state action where the state had not placed its im-
primatur on the termination practices by ordering that they be
utilized, but merely permitted (and approved) that such activity may
be performed at the initiative of a private party. 52 With regard to
that there was no closed class of businesses affected with the public interest, and that "the
function of courts in the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is to determine
in each case whether the circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable
exertion of governmental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or "discriminatory." Id.
Unless the Court in Jackson has discarded the multi-dimensional state action analysis in
favor of a single factor test, the reasoning employed in Nebbia is inapposite to the situation
presented in Jackson. The determination of the Nebbia Court that "affected with the public
interest" is an inappropriate single factor test in a review of the legitimacy of the state police
power, would seem to have little bearing upon the type of state action analysis propounded in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). To the contrary, it is submitted
that a determination that a business is affected with the public interest is an important, if not
indispensible consideration in the multi-faceted state action test. See 95 S. Ct. at 464-65
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
'° 95 S. Ct. at 455. Once again, the Court failed to provide a rationale for its rejection of
this factor as evidence of state action. Assuming that Metropolitan was affected with a public
interest, the proper question would have been whether there was something more than that
status sufficient to justify a finding of state action in the present case. Justice Douglas agreed
"that doctors, lawyers, and grocers are not transformed into state actors simply because they
provide arguably essential goods and services and are regulated by the State." Id. at 459
(Douglas, J., dissenting). However, he reasoned that "[i]n the present case . . . respondent is
not just one person among many; it is the only public utility furnishing electric power to the
town." Id.
S
' Id. at 455-57.
52
 See notes 99-104 infra & accompanying text. Under the Jackson Court's approach,
there is no state action where a state merely permits, rather than orders, that an activity be
performed. This type of analysis is similar to that employed by lower federal courts in
disposing of procedural due process attacks upon "self-help repossession." Self-help reposses-
sion is a remedy available to secured parties, as provided under Uniform Commercial Code
9-503, and, in most states, under prior-existing common law. The self-help remedy is
usually deemed consensual in nature and is treated as an available procedure, rather than a
process that is mandated upon debtor default. Since it is not the only remedy open to secured
parties, courts have reasoned that there was insufficient encouragement by the state to
activate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal.
First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, '330 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). However,
these courts have failed to consider the variety of less direct encouragements to utilize the
remedy. For example, consider that the increasing costs of proceeding to secure collateral by
judicial process, as by a writ of replevin, make the speedy and inexpensive self-help remedy
even more appealing. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Note also that the self-help remedy is impliedly written into every security agreement "unless
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the final contention that Metropolitan and the state were joint
participants and joint beneficiaries in the provision of utility ser-
vice," the Court concluded that the state could neither be deemed a
partner nor a joint venturer in the enterprise, where all that had
been shown was that the utility was privately owned but heavily
regulated by the state, that Metropolitan was singularly responsible
for the provision of service, and that it paid taxes to the state in
common with other corporations. 54
Despite these arguments, the Jackson Court found that there
was an insufficient nexus between the state and the challenged
practice of Metropolitan's termination of electrical service to war-
rant a finding of state action. 55 It appears that in reaching this
conclusion, the Court failed to consider the combined effect of these
various indicia, and thus fell short of attributing to these factors
their true significance in the state action analysis. It is submitted
that, had the Court truly engaged in its previously-approved process
of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances,"56 and had it assessed
the cumulative effect of all the facets of state involvement in Met-
ropolitan's termination procedures, it should have found that an
identifiable nexus was present." The Court's own sufficiency test
seems to have been misapplied, since: (1) Metropolitan provided the
only source of electrical power to persons in its service area; 58 (2) the
state's licensing and regulatory schemes in conjunction with natural
market forces protected Metropolitan's monopoly-like status to some
degree; 59 and (3) due to the combination of all identified factors, the
state's authorization of Metropolitan's exercise of its choice to termi-
nate service by summary means amounted to a grant of a
government-like power that was too apt . to be used carelessly by the
otherwise agreed," Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503, a fact attributed no importance by the
courts. See generally Adams, 492 F.2d at 330.
53 95 S. Ct. at 457.
5* Id. The Court sought to identify the type of "symbiotic relationship" that was present
in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). It concluded that the cir-
cumstances presented in Jackson fell short of this extensive relationship; in other words, the
State of Pennsylvania had not so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Metropolitan that it could be deemed a joint participant in the enterprise. 95 S. Ct. at 457.
But consider Justice Marshall's statement that "Me pattern of cooperation between Met-
ropolitan Edison and the State has led to significant state involvement in virtually every phase
of the company's business," Id. at 462-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also id. at 459-60
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
Note also that the Court failed to account for Pennsylvania's imposition of a special tax
upon the gross receipts of public utilities. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72 § 8101 (Supp. 1974). The
interplay of monopoly status—or at leak the insulation from competitive market forces—and
this special tax upon gross receipts, would appear to be more of a mutually beneficial
relationship than the Court was willing to admit.
55 95 S. Ct. at 457.
36 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
57 See notes 70-87 infra & accompanying text.
38 95 S. Ct. at 459 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
59 See 43 U.S.L.W. at 4115-16, 4117-18. See generally Comment, 74 Colum. L. Rev.
656, 663-72 (1974); Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1487-91 (1973).
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utility. To the extent that the majority remains unwilling to consider
the actual effect and interrelationship between the full panoply of
state involvement in the type of situation presented in Jackson, the
Court thus prevents electric consumers from resorting to the federal
courts for a review of their Due Process claims against the practice
of summary termination of electrical service. 6°
II. THE EMERGING STATE ACTION TEST
It appears that the Jackson opinion presents significant de-
velopments in the Fourteenth Amendment state action analysis. The
approach taken by the majority of the Court in Jackson differs from
that utilized in earlier cases in two respects: first, in terms of the
type of inquiry conducted; and second, in terms of the sufficiency test
by which the question of state involvement was determined. Although
the opinion in Jackson fails to make any significant contribution to the
development of a definitive constitutional standard, 6 ' an understand-
ing of the nature of this departure hopefully will assist in predicting the
course that the Court will follow in resolving state action issues.
A. Type of Judicial Inquiry
It would appear from the Jackson opinion, that the Court has
decided that the state action issue is to be considered independent of
the substantive question of whether the challenged action works a
deprivation of a constitutionally protectible interest. 62 Under this
approach, a determination is first made as to the presence or ab-
sence of state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes; and then,
only if state action is found, will the Court address the issues of the
complainant's entitlement to protection of the interest and whether
there has been a violation of that right. 63 Although this method of
60 This note assumes that had there been state action in Metropolitan's termination
procedures, Jackson would have been entitled, at the minimum, to notice and a right to an
informal hearing before cessation of electric power. For suggested procedures that could be
employed, see Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1494 (1973).
61
 In the sense that the state action test still depends upon a careful analysis of the facts
of each case presented, and given the realization that "RIlifferences in circumstances beget
appropriate differences in law," Whitney v. State Tax Comm'n, 309 U.S. 530, 542 (1940),
Jackson does not present a guideline test. Although the workability of broad guideline
opinions may be questioned as a general proposition, there remains a school of thought
favoring the development of definitive constitutional standards in selected areas. See, e.g.,
North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975), where Justice Blackmun
was joined in his dissent by Justice Rehnquist in arguing that a due process standard for
measuring the constitutional validity of creditor-debtor statutes is needed. Id. at 726-29 (dissent-
ing opinion).
62 95 S. Ct. at 452 n.2, 457.
63
 See id. at 457. It is in this sense that in a suit brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment, state action is often referred to as a "jurisdictional fact." Unless the complaining
party can establish sufficient state involvement to warrant a finding of state action the federal
judge must dismiss the action, on defendant's motion, for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
The finding of state action is a condition precedent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Cf.
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932). See also note 10 supra.
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evaluating claims under the Fourteenth Amendment is established
in the cases," it has not been considered settled law that the state
action question is determined without at least a cursory examination
of the nature of the substantive right being asserted."
By developing this strict approach, the Jackson Court has in
effect prescribed that judicial consideration of the sufficiency of state
involvement must take place in a vacuum. Seemingly, the fact that
an individual may have been deprived of a protected interest be-
cause of the color of his skin would be of no relevance in the type of
inquiry suggested in Jackson. 66 The appearance that the Court has
rejected the notion that "different standards should apply . . . when
different constitutional claims are presented," 67 troubles Justice
Marshall, who forebodes:
Thus, the majority's analysis would seemingly apply as
well to a company that refused to extend service to Ne-
groes, welfare recipients, or any other group that the com-
pany preferred, for its own reasons, not to serve. I cannot
believe that this Court would hold that the State's in-
volvement with the utility company was not sufficient to
impose upon the company an obligation to meet the con-
stitutional mandate of non-discrimination. Yet nothing in
the analysis of the majority suggests otherwise. 68
The application of an invariable standard precludes any balancing
of competing interests. This type of inquiry requires that the same
quantum of state involvement must be present in the challenged
activity no matter how invidious the deprivation. Unless the Court
" See, e.g., Adicks. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
65 See, e.g., id. at 190-91 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). A state action
analysis that attempts to discern the same quantum of state involvement without any consid-
eration of the nature of the constitutional claim raises some difficulty in terms of recent
Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-71 (1973);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 114-21 (1973).
Compare Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), with
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. .551 (1972). At least two commentators have suggested that
in the state action area, the Court has engaged in a balancing of the constitutional rights of
complaining parties with the need for certain types of governmental regulation. See Com-
ment, 74 Colum, L. Rev. 656, 658-59 (1974); Comment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 840, 841-42 (1974).
66
 See 95 S. Ct. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting), This would certainly prove to be a
remarkable turn of events, given the belief of commentators that, for all practical purposes,
the state action requirement in the Equal Protection area had met its demise. See Note, 74
Colum. L. Rev. 656, 657 (1974). See also Black, The Supreme Court 1966 Term, Forward:
"State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 100-03
(1967); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 30 S. Cal. L. Rev. 208, 209 (1957); Karst & Horowitz, A Telophase of Substantive
Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 39, 55-58 (1967); Williams, The Twilight of State
Action, 41 Texas L. Rev. 347, 378 (1963).
65 95 S. Ct. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan would apparently agree
with Justice Marshall's belief that a lesser quantum of state involvement will suffice in actions
where racial discrimination is alleged. See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 190-91 (1970).
68 95 S. Ct. at 465 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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is prepared to modify this inflexible approach when reviewing Equal
Protection instead of Due Process claims, Justice Marshall's criti-
cism of the majority opinion in Jackson would seem to be
justified—at least in those areas where the impetus to act is derived
from "private" racial prejudices. 69
69
 Recent cases would seem, at least, to foreshadow Justice Marshall's ominous predic-
tions. See, e.g., Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970), discussed in note 99 infra, where the
actual result of Supreme Court action was to give effect to a racially motivated condition in
testator's will; the Court viewed the discrimination as having been interjected by a private
party rather than the state. See also Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972),
discussed in note 27 supra, where the Court found the state insufficiently involved in the
private club's racially restrictive membership or guest policies, particularly since the impetus
to discriminate was from private individuals and not the state. But see Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966), discussed in note 99 infra; cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), also
discussed in note 99 infra. See also notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
The case of Bowman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960), may be
the type of situation that Justice Marshall had in mind when he noted dissatisfaction with the
majority's new approach to the state action test, especially since he served as co-counsel for
the appellants in Bowman. It is appropriate to consider just how this racial discrimination
case might fare under the Court's strict test. The same day the City of Birmingham repealed a
provision of its code that required the racial segregation of patrons on buses operating within
city limits, the city commission enacted a new ordinance, which provided: (1) that carriers of
passengers for hire were authorized to promulgate seating regulations that were "reasonably
necessary" and (2) that failure to obey the "reasonable request" of an operator would consti-
tute a breach of the peace. The bus company made no change in its policy of segregated
seating. A few days later, nine out of a group of 25 Blacks, all of whom had refused to obey
the order of the driver to move to the rear, were arrested for breach of the peace, Id. at
532-33. Although the trial court held that the arrests were illegal in that the Blacks had been
deprived of their civil rights, the court found that police officers had acted on their own
accord, and not at the express behest of the bus company or their superior officers. The class
action that had been brought, seeking to enjoin the company from enforcing its published
rules requiring racial segregation, was thus dismissed. Id. at 533-34.
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the case was reversed and remanded, wherein it was held
that the bus company had become an agent of the state in its actions of promulgating and
enforcing rules that were racially discriminatory. Id. at 535-36. The court relied upon Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), emphasizing that the city had granted a franchise to this
privately owned, public utility that, in its terms, performed a public function. 280 F.2d at
535-36. Appellants had "failed in their proof to show joint or agreed action between the
appellee and the City Commissioners, [and thus] lost the opportunity to argue that the Bus
Company's action was, for that reason, state action." Id. at 534.
In the aftermath of Jackson, it is difficult to predict in just what manner the Court would
deal with the type of situation presented in Bowman. From a result-oriented perspective, it
would seem quite inconceiveable that the Court could let these rights remain unvindicated in
an instance of such obvious cooperation between the city and the bus company in achieving
the discriminatory result. The line of analysis that would be employed to justify this federal
intervention is, however, not so predictable, especially in light of the failure of appellants to
show joint action between the city and the company. Query whether the Court's analysis
would be any different if the bus company was endowed with a power to control the seating
patterns of its patrons that derived from the common law, a right that had been in effect for
more than a century prior to the cause of action.
Consider that in litigation attacking the constitutionality of self-help repossession as
violative of procedural due process, courts have typically held that there was no state action
in the enactment of Uniform Commercial Code 9-503, because this was a mere codification
of a common law right. See, e.g., Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324,
330 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 95 S. Ct. 325 (1974). The Jackson court has noted in passing, and




A review of state action cases, 7 ° including Jackson, reveals that
there is no "litmus test"' to measure, for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the sufficiency of state involvement in a
particular factual situation. A precise formula has never been de-
vised to resolve the difficulty involved in making this threshold
determination. 72 In recent years, courts have relied upon the type of
inquiry developed by the Supreme Court in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 73 and later explicated in Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis. 74 In Burton and Moose Lodge, the Court utilized a multi-
dimensional approach in an attempt to discern whether there was
a sufficiently close relationship between the state and the challenged
conduct so that the activity could be fairly treated as that of the
state. 75 The state action analysis employed by the Court in Burton
was comprehensive and flexible; state action was viewed as a cumu-
lation of a broad range of factors that collectively demonstrated the
nature and extent of state involvement in the challenged activity.
The Burton test was a process of "sifting facts and weighing cir-
cumstances," 76 an identification of these indices and evaluation of
the sufficiency of the nexus between the state and the activity under
scrutiny, based upon the facts as presented in each case. Presum-
ably, this nexus could be established through a single factor of
sufficient magnitude. However, the test set forth in Burton, unlike
that apparently applied in Jackson, clearly entailed a cumulative
analysis—an assessment of the factors collectively, so as to attribute
to nonobvious state involvement in private conduct its true sig-
nificance. 77
The Court in Jackson, however, has taken what would appear
to be a markedly different tack. Rather than weighing and assessing
nonpayment. 95 S. Ct. at 455 n.11. Query, then, whether there would be any similarity in a
situation where a secured party engaged in a constant practice of repossessing collateral from
defaulting Black debtors by self-help means (pursuant to the security arrangement and/or
Uniform Commercial Code § 9-503), but proceeded against all other debtors through judicial
process by seeking a writ of replevin.
7° E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435 (1970); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
71 Comment, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 493, 495 (1973).
72 In Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), the Court recognized that "[t]he
constitutional command for a state to afford 'equal protection of the laws' sets a goal not
attainable by invention and application of a precise formula, This Court has never attempted
that impossible task." Id. at 556.
73 365 U.S. 715 (1961). For a brief discussion of the case, see note 95 infra.
74 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For a brief discussion of the case, see note 27 supra.
73 See Jackson, 95 S. Ct. at 453.
76 365 U.S. at 722.
77 "As our . . . discussion in Burton made clear, the dispositive question in any state
action case is not whether any single fact or relationship presents a sufficient degree of state
involvement, but whether the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a finding of state
responsibility." Jackson, 95 S. Ct. at 458-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the various factors cumulatively, the majority chose to apply the test
in a sequential fashion. 78 As Justice Douglas argued in his dissenting
opinion, is not enough to examine seriatim each of the factors
upon which the claimant relies and to dismiss each individually as
being insufficient to support a finding of state action. It is the
aggregate that is controlling." 79
Justice Douglas's analysis of the majority's approach as being
"fundamentally sequential rather than cumulative,"" is borne out
by a reading of the majority opinion. First, it is noted that while the
majority opinion cited to Burton in no fewer than three instances, 8 '
the specific quote referring to the need for "weighing and sifting" all
of the evidence of state involvement is found only in Justice Doug-
las's dissent. 82 Second, the majority characterized Jackson's argu-
ment as a "series of contentions," concluding that "[wje find none
of them persuasive."83 Third, and most revealing, was the ensuing
discussion of each of these contentions. Although the Court stated
that all of petitioner's arguments were, in fact, "taken together," 84 a
careful review of the Court's approach warrants the contrary con-
clusion. The majority engaged in an analysis that failed to recognize
that the combined effect of the state's involvement in two or more of
the areas identified by Jackson would have greater weight than if
each were considered separately." The only correlation between
factors apparently considered by the Court involved the aspect of
state regulation of the utility, which was viewed by the majority as
an underlying condition of minor significance. 86 The interrelating
effect of monopoly status with the other factors of state action,
which was attributed great weight by both Justices Douglas and
Marshall" was not even discussed in the majority opinion.
Another important facet of this new sufficiency test follows
from the Court's treatment of the issue of state authorization and
approval of Metropolitan's termination procedures. 88 The Court's
traditional approach in this area has been to admit the presence of
the state when it has lent its imprimatur to the challenged action in
78 Though the Court pays lip service to the need for assessing the totality of the
.state's involvement in this enterprise . . . its underlying analysis is fundamentally
sequential rather than cumulative. In that perspective, what the Court does today is
to make a significant departure from our previous treatment of state action issues.
Id. at 459 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
88 Id.
81 See id. at 453-54.
82 Id. at 458 (Douglas, J.., dissenting).
15
 Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
14 Id. at 457.
° 5 See id. at 457-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 453. The nexus text is discussed in the context of the aspect of state
regulation, but the Court treats this factor differently than it treats Jackson's other conten-
tions. See also note 29 & text at notes 29-33 supra.
87 95 S. Ct. at 458-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8° Id. at 455-57.
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a constitutionally cognizable fashion.' 9 In developing a more rigid
standard, the six-Justice majority in Jackson held that the state
would need to have ordered Metropolitan to use summary proce-
dures before state action could be found. 9° Analysis of the leading
state action cases reveals the extent of the Jackson Court's depar-
ture;" these prior cases indicate that the requisite state involvement
would be found to exist when an activity was "sanctioned in some
way,"92 "foster[ed] or encourage[d],"93 or where the state placed "its
power, property, and prestige behind" 94 the particular act. In Bur-
ton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, the Court went so far as to
detect this imprimatur in the inaction of the state. 95 The majority in
Jackson, however, has now concluded that nothing less than an
affirmative command by the state will suffice to constitute state
action;96 and, it has done so relying almost exclusively upon its
decision in Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak." This result, in
89 See cases cited in id. at 462-63 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
" 95 S. Ct. at 456-57. "[W]here the Commission has not put its own weight on the side
of the proposed practice by ordering it, [approval of a tariff request] does not transmute a
practice initiated by the utility and approved by the Commission into 'state action'." Id.
91 Justice Marshall commented that "the suggestion that the state would have to 'put its
own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it' seems to me to mark a sharp
departure from our previous state action cases." Id. at 462 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See,
e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). These cases are arguably
distinguishable on the grounds that they dealt with Equal Protection rather than Due Process
claims. However, on the basis of the Court's analysis in Jackson, it is not entirely clear that
such a distinction is supportable. See notes 62-69 supra & accompanying text.
92
 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17 (1883).
93 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
94 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
95 Id. The Eagle Coffee Shoppe, Inc., a privately owned restaurant, was located in a
parking facility owned and operated by the State of Delaware. Appellant was refused food or
drink by the restaurant, and brought action against the restaurant and the state agency,
alleging the violation of rights guaranteed under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 716. In view of all of the circumstances in the case, the Court held
that the state was a joint participant in the operation of the restaurant, and that the
restaurant's refusal to serve appellant was therefore a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. at 725. In point of fact, however, it was the state's inaction in remedying the
policy of racial discrimination that was at issue. "By its inaction, . . . the State . . . has not
only made itself a party to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination." Id: (emphasis added).
96 95 S. Ct. at 455-57. In fairness to the Court's position, it is noted that the opinion
restates the observation of the district court "that the sole connection of the Commission with
this regulation was Metropolitan's simple notice filing with the Commission and the lack of
any Commission action to prohibit at 456. See also id. at 455-56 n.13. But consider
Justice Douglas's concerns that through "neglect or listless oversight," the Commission might
have allowed the utility to perpetuate the injury. Id. at 459-60 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
97 343 U.S. 451 (1952). For a brief statement of the facts of the case, see note 28 supra.
The Court distinguishes the circumstances involved in Pollak from those of Jackson by
reasoning that the state did not place its imprimatur upon Metropolitan's termination prac-
tices. Whereas the Commission in Pollak investigated and held a hearing on the transit
company's practices, and it had not only approved but encouraged the radio broadcasts, the
state public utilities commission in Jackson took no such affirmative action, and therefore
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itself, seems to manifest a clear departure from the Supreme Court's
prior decisions."
C. Public-Private Choice: The Impetus to Act
The fundamental importance of Jackson is that it reflects a new
approach to the state action question, one that is characterized by a
narrow type of inquiry and the application of a more rigid test to
measure the sufficiency of state involvement. A consideration of the
direction in which the Court is heading in its treatment of the
public-private dichotomy embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
will hopefully assist in understanding the significance of the Jackson
opinion. An analysis of Jackson, taken in conjunction with the
earlier cases of Evans v. Abney," and Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
failed to "put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering it . . ." 95 S.
Ct. at 456-57. But see notes 37, 40 & text at note 41 supra.
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 95 S. Ct. at 462-63 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall contends that
none of the previous state action cases so much as suggest that such an extreme form of
authorization or approval is required. Id. at 462-63 n.2. The language utilized in the cited
cases would appear to support his argument.
99 396 U.S. 435 (1970). In Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), the precursor of
Abney, the Court ruled that the charitable trust in the 1911 will of Senator Bacon, which
created a park for the exclusive use of white people, violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Although control of the park was left to a (private) Board of
Managers, the Court reasoned that "when private individuals or groups are endowed by the
State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumen-
talities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations." Id. at 299. The majority
concluded that the public nature of the park required that it be subject to the Equal
Protection Clause, and ruled that it "may not be operated for the public on a segregated basis
. . ." Id. at 302.
In Evans v. Abney, the Court was once again faced with the Georgia courts' treatment of
the Bacon will. The state court had held that since the purpose of the testamentary trust was
impossible of accomplishment, the trust instrument would have to fail and the property revert
to testator's heirs. 396 U.S. at 439. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Black, held
that the state courts did "no more than apply well-settled general principles of Georgia law to
determine the meaning" of the will. Id. The claims of petitioners that this determination
resulted in a denial of Equal Protection were rejected by the Court because, in its view, the
benefits of the trust were being denied to everyone, "whites as well as Negroes." Id. at 446.
The basic effect of Abney was that the Supreme Court left standing a state court decision
which invalidated the trust because of the impossibility of complying with testator's intent
"that the park remain forever for the exclusive use of white people." Id. at 447. Although the
Court in Abney preferred to view as the focal aspect of the case the fact that the impetus to
discriminate originated with the private individual, i.e., private as opposed to public choice,
in terms of the Court's state action analysis, it is difficult to square Abney with Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
The question presented in Shelley was the constitutional permissability of state court
enforcement of racially restrictive convenants under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Reasoning that that Amendment "erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful," the Court sought to identify "such
actions as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Id. at 13. The restrictive covenant
involved in this case was an agreement between private individuals to prevent the sale or use
of real property by members of a designated racial class of persons. The Court concluded:
[T]he restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any
rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as the
purposes of those agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms,
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Irvis, w° indicates that the state action analysis will now focus upon
a determination of the origin of the initiative to perform the chal-
lenged activity.'°' Where the initiative to act originates with the
state, the resulting behavior will be subjected to the proscriptions of
the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the actor is a private indi-
vidual.'° 2 However, where the impetus to act derives from the
exercise of private choice, the activity will be immune from the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
If this public-private dichotomy is conceptualized as a horizon-
tal line, with purely private acts located on its far left side, and
purely public acts situated on the far right, plotting the position of
any particular activity on this continuum will be primarily a func-
tion of the origin of the driving force behind the activity. This is the
essence of the state action test employed in Jackson. It is neither
particularly novel, nor does it establish a precise test of what will be
treated as an act of the state under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rather than focusing solely upon the identity of the actor or the
character of the resulting behavior, the test turns upon a determina-
tion of whether it is the state or a private party that exercises the
choice to act.
Fundamentally, this current approach to the state action
analysis reflects the development of a new doctrine of substantive
due processw4—an emerging trend of ad-hoc judicial policy-making
it would appear clear that there has been no action by the State and the provisions of
the Amendment have not been violated.
Id. The Court held that judicial enforcement of the covenant would amount to state participa-
tion in the discriminatory acts of the private parties, or "state action" that was fully proscrib-
able under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 19. Compare Justice Brennan's dissent in
Abney, 396 U.S. at 450-59, with the dissents of Justice Black and Harlan in Newton, 382 U.S.
at 312-22,
lt" 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For a discussion of Moose Lodge, see note 27 supra.
ror 95 S. Ct. at 455-56.
'w E.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth.,
365 U.S. 715 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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 See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396
U.S. 435 (1970). Cf. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In theory, at least, state action
may be found even where the impetus to act is "private;" in Moose Lodge the Court reasoned:
"Our holdings indicate that where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the state must
have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations,' Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 380 (1967), in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the ambit of the
constitutional prohibition." 407 U.S. at 173. In a practical sense, however, Moose Lodge,
Abney, and Jackson indicate the extraordinary difficulty of connecting the state to a specific
act or activity where the impetus to engage in that conduct is derived from an individual's
private choice. The use of the term "private" in this context would seem inappropriate,
inasmuch as the existence of a sufficient nexus with the state justifies treating the challenged
activity as state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
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 The term "substantive due process" refers to a doctrine supporting judicial control
over economic legislation—on both state and federal levels. It was a theory of "economic due
process" that emerged and came to fruition in the courts during•the ignominious heyday of
laissez-faire economics in American society. Compare Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877),
with Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). But see NLRB
885
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that is based upon the subjective views of the Justices as to the
proper plotting of "public" and "private" on this horizontal line.
One of the principal results of the Jackson case is that the Court has
moved the boundary of Fourteenth Amendment immunity afforded
private conduct farther to the right of this continuum, requiring
greater state involvement. Thus, the Court has extended this im-
munity to activities that could arguably be considered public in
nature. The effect of this move is clear; it further limits the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. In Jackson, the Court has removed the
obligation of protecting certain interests of utility customers, argu-
ably guaranteed by the United States Constitution, from the federal
judiciary, and has left this responsibility to the Congress, state
legislatures and state courts.
Viewing Jackson in the context of prior state action cases, it is
arguable that the majority was executing a planned retreat from the
broader implications of this historic doctrine. Of particular sig-
nificance is the predictable movement of this Court toward at least a
modification of the full' scope of the doctrine of Shelley v.
Kraemer."" Shelley stands for the rule that judicial enforcement of
a racially discriminatory condition in a restrictive covenant consti-
tutes state action. Quite notably, the impetus to discriminate in
Shelley originated with private homeowners acting in their purely
private capacities.":16
 Query how long this doctrine is to be expected
to withstand erosion in future state action cases.'" It is not conceiv-
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See generally E. Barrett & P. Brutton,
Constitutional Law: Cases and Materials, chs. 5, 10, at 258-326, 692-753 (4th ed. 1973).
The term "substantive due process" has been employed to refer to the Court's use of the
Due Process Clause to give effect to "natural" or "fundamental" law in the cases. Consider
Justice Holmes's famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, supra:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country
does not entertain. . . . I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement [with
that theory] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions
in law. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact -
 Mr. Herbert Spencer's
Social Statics. . . . Some [state] laws embody convictions or prejudices which judges
are likely to share. Some may not. But a constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and organic relation of the citizen
to the State or of laissez faire.
198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). Consider also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952), where the majority held that evidence obtained by police officers from petitioner by
"stomach pumping," was taken in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  •
What the majority hold is that the Due Process Clause empowers this Court to
nullify any state law if its application "shocks the conscience," offends "a sense of
justice" or runs counter to the•"decencies of civilized conduct." The majority em-
phasize that these statements do not refer to their own consciences or to their senses
of justice and decency.
Id. at 175 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black was particularly concerned that the
"accordion-like qualities" of this application of the "evanescent standards of the majority's
philosophy" would imperil the "individual liberty safeguards specifically enumerated in the
Bill of Rights." Id. at 177.
1 " 334 U.S. 1 (1948). For a discussion of Shelley, see note 99 supra.
1 °6
 Id. at 10-14.
I' See, e.g., H. Friendly, The Dartmouth College Case and the Public-Private
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able that the present majority would attempt to make inroads in the
aspect of the case which holds that judicial action constitutes state
action.'" It is possible that Shelley will be limited nonetheless, if
the Court continues to focus upon the origin of the impetus to act.
Were the Shelley case to be presented after the decision in Jackson,
it is at least arguable that the Court could find the nexus between
the state and the challenged activity to be insufficient since the
choice to discriminate was not only exercised by, but also originated
with private individuals.'"
III. CONCLUSION
The framers and the amenders of the United States Constitu-
tion apparently embodied in that document their fears of harsh and
arbitrary governmental action on the one hand, and their desires to
enhance and protect the societal values of pluralism, personal au-
tonomy, and the maximization of opportunity for individual choice
on the other.'" The Jackson decision does not reflect similar consid-
erations. If these fundamental values still inhere in the essential
public-private dichotomy, it is difficult, as Justice Marshall notes, to
ascertain or indeed, "to imagine any such interests that are furthered
by protecting public utility companies from meeting constitutional
standards that would apply if the companies were state-owned. The
values of pluralism and diversity are simply not relevant when the
private company is the only electric company in town.""'' Although
the Court took great pains to stress the importance of the public-
private dichotomy in Jackson," 2 notably absent from the opinion is
any discussion of whether the disposition in the case actually pre-
served and promoted the values inherent in that essential distinc-
tion. Unless the Court can be expected to limit Jackson to its
peculiar facts, or to limit its state action analysis to Due Process
claims rather than to have it apply to Equal Protection litigation as
well, it would not seem unreasonable to suggest that the private
aspect of this essential dichotomy is being stretched beyond its
intended and acceptable limits.'"
Penumbra (1969); Wechsler, Towards Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv, L.
Rev. 1 (1959). But see Pollack, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Intergrity: A Reply to
Professor Wechsler, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959).
ma Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1971), and Sniadach v. Family Fin, Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969), with North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975),
and Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974). In these procedural due process cases,
the Court has not deviated from the doctrine that judicial action is imputable to the state for
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process purposes.
'" See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435
(1970).
"° See 95 S. Ct. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
12 Id. at 453.
"3 The Second Circuit in the recent case of Holodnak v, Avco Corp., Civil No.74-2381
(2nd Cir., filed Feb. 18, 1975)., viewed the Jackson decision as having an application limited
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The Court should be loathe, as were the founders, to impose
constitutional limitations upon relationships between private per-
sons. That reluctance, however, should not be so extreme as to
preclude the imposition of constitutional restrictions upon private
entities which derive significant powers or aid from government, or
which operate in a manner functionally indistinguishable from gov-
ernment itself.
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court in Jackson improperly
granted immunity from the Fourteenth Amendment to Metropoli-
tan, a monopolistic public utility that operated much like a govern-
ment substitute in supplying electrical power to its service area." 4
Metropolitan engaged in a practice of summary terminations of
service, and admittedly, the choice of whether or not to employ this
practice in a particular situation was influenced not by public-
interest concerns, but was rather motivated by a business-type de-
sire to maximize profit. 15
 If it can be assumed, arguendo, that
Jackson had a constitutionally protectible entitlement to service, 16
and further, that private individuals are to be protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment from the arbitrary exercise of powers by
persons or entities functioning as government surrogates,"' it is
to its peculiar facts. The threshold question presented in Avco, a case that arose out of a labor
dispute, was "whether the Government has become sufficiently entangled in the actions of a
private party to warrant a requirement that such conduct conform to constitutional standards
of behavior." Id. at 1832. As a defense contractor, Avco's plant, the land upon which it was
built, as well as most of the "equipment used in the manufacturing process," were owned by
the federal government. Id. at 1833-34. Additional circumstances indicated the extent of
interdependence, cooperation and mutual benefit the existed between Avco and the federal
government. The court of appeals read Jackson as having recognized the continuing viability
of the principal set forth in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), "that
where the state goes beyond mere regulation of private conduct, and becomes in effect a
`partner' or 'joint venturer' in the enterprise, the inference of state responsibility for the
proscribed conduct could be made." Holodnak, supra at 1836-37. The Court viewed the evidence
and concluded that "[elven a cursory perusal of the facts in this case indicates that the government
involvement in Avco's operations typified the 'symbiotic relationship', . . . which the Court failed
to find in Jackson." Id. Thus, the court in Avco distinguished the Jackson case on the basis of the
partnership-joint venturer concept espoused in Burton, and found sufficient Government action
to activate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
" 4
 See Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 665 (7th Cir. 1972) (dissent-
ing opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (197.3). See also 95 S. Ct. at 462 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
"5 95 S. Ct. at 456 n.15.
"6 The Court in Jackson never reached this issue because of its conclusion on the
threshold question of state action. "We therefore have no occasion to decide whether petition-
ers claim to continued service was "property" for purposes of that Amendment, or whether
"due process of law" would require a State taking similar action to accord petitioner the
procedural rights for which she contends." Id. at 457. However, Justice Douglas would hold
that "[ejlectrical service, being a necessity of life under the circumstances of this case, is an
entitlement which under our decisions may not be taken without the requirements of pro-
cedural due process." Id. at 460 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall would apparently
agree. Id. at 464-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" 7
 This is the ultimate purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 95 S. Ct. at 460
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 464 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Burke & Reber,
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equally clear that this immunity granted to Metropolitan was in
derogation of these rights." 8
 It is thus suggested that the facts of
this case belie the majority's conclusion that there was no state
action present in the summary termination of electricity.
An important question raised by the Jackson case is the extent
to which it will actually settle the state action issue in the public
utilities area generally. Given the fundamental premise that any test
for the presence of the state, for the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment, must depend significantly upon an analysis of the par-
ticular facts in each case, and in view of the language employed in
the Jackson opinion itself, 19 it would appear that there remains
much room for arguing that even minor variations in the cir-
cumstances of another utility case could require a different result.
Inasmuch as this sort of ad-hoc test tends to be both imprecise and
unpredictable as well, confusion in the legal community is an inevit-
able result. Furthermore, the absence of even a general standard to
measure state action exacerbates rather than ameliorates the
caseload problem. The Court's application of a sliding scale in terms
of the sufficiency requirement of the state involvement, which turns
upon analysis of specific facts in specific situations, is a process that
invites rather than discourages litigation when factual dissimilarities
are rather minor. If one of the principal desires of the present
majority of the Court can be identified as that of minimizing the role
of the federal courts in this area of law, and for that matter in other
areas of section 1983 litigation, the Jackson decision must be viewed
as having added little substance to the development of a clear
standard for state action analysis.
Jackson leaves itself open for a broad interpretation and expan-
sive application, limiting the circumstances in which state action
will be found. It is now incumbent upon the Court to indicate in
subsequent decisions just how far it intended to go in furthering a more
conservative trend in the Due Process-state action analysis. It is hoped
that in future cases the Court will indicate that many of the predictions
proffered in this note regarding the novel aspects of the Jackson
opinion are without substance. Moreover, in the application of the
principles embodied in Jackson, the Court should not prove itself so
intractable that it will not reconsider the potentially adverse conse-
State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors Rights; An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, I, 46 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1003 (1973); II, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
"I Consider that, upon occasion, public utilities have successfully excluded themselves
from the reach of the antitrust laws by arguing that they perform a public function and that
their monopolistic activity should be treated as state action. See 95 S. Ct. at 459-60 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d 638, 662 (7th Cir. 1972)
(dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Note, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1477, 1489
n.70 (1973). Cf. Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple Univ., 43 U.S.L.W. 2241 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 11, 1974), wherein the Court would not give credence to the claim of the UniVersity that
it was a "private" institution, since it had in the past attained benefits as a result of claiming
that it was public in nature. Id.
" 9 See note 47 supra.
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quences of holding, as a general proposition, that public utilities are
immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth AlnerldMerit. 12°
ROBERT B. CARPENTER
12° Justice Marshall concluded: "Today the Court takes a major step in repudiating [a)
line of authority and adopts a stance that is bound to lead to mischief when applied to
problems beyond the narrow sphere of due process objections to utility terminations." 95 S.
Ct. at 461 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Compare id. with Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 315
(1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting), wherein he reasoned:
More serious than the absence of any firm doctrinal support for this theory of
state action are its potentialities for thi future. . . It substitutes for the compara-
tively clear and concrete tests of'state action a catch-phrase approach as vague and
amorphous as it is far-reaching. It dispenses with the sound and careful principles of
past decisions in this realm. And it carries the seeds of transferring to federal
authority vast areas of concern whose regulation has wisely been left by the constitu-
tion to the states.
Id, at 321-22. Although Justice Harlan feared the expansion of the federal courts into
"private" action, and Justice Marshall was concerned with precisely the converse, a retraction
of federal jurisdiction over "public action," both of these jurists expressed anxiety as to
over-zealous application of a contemporary trend in the Court's state action analysis.
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